By Al LaFleche
Those of us who’ve spent much time reading about the history of World War II, especially the air war in Europe, have learned a few things. The British bombed at night, the Americans during the day. Civilian casualties were unplanned but unavoidable collateral damage. The Norden bombsight was extremely accurate. The bombing pretty much brought Germany to its knees and seriously disrupted resupply. The air war was very costly to the Allies but worse for the Axis.
In The Bombers and the Bombed (Viking Press 2013), Richard Overy dispels all but the first statement above.
In an extremely well researched and annotated text (over a hundred pages of notes and bibliography alone), Mr. Overy documents how the British in particular saw those who worked in the factories as being part of the war machine and justifiable targets. This decision went as high as Churchill and Roosevelt. Residential areas around factories were considered fair game, with the hope of both slowing production and reducing support for the Reich.
It didn’t work that way until the last few months of the war, Mr. Overy contends. With manufacturing sites decentralized and scattered, bombing them did little to slow production. Germany had an abundant supply of labor, forced or otherwise, to work in unhealthy underground situations. German manufacture of aircraft increased through 1944.
Mr. Overy also contends, with voluminous data, that “strategic” high level bombing with the technology of the 1940’s was woefully inaccurate. Targets were rarely hit by more than a minute proportion of the bomb loads, if at all. Indeed, it was uncommon to have more than 10% of the bombs fall within a kilometer of the target.
It remains a bit unclear how much the German people actually wanted to continue to produce goods for the Reich and how much they did so for fear of reprisals.
The author notes that, repeatedly in air raids, the allies lost more aircrews than casualties on the ground, except, again, until the last few months of the war.
He also takes note of the bombing campaigns in Italy, France, the low countries, and the Scandinavian countries. The Italian campaign tended to be more “tactical,” in direct support of ground military action, and a bit more limited. In the rest of Europe, and in France in particular, the targeting of civilian populations and carpet bombing of cities became a very difficult sell to the population on the ground, threatening post war alliances before they were even agreed to.
This book, while deeply informative, is not a particularly fun read. It feels more like a textbook; at times the author dropped so many numbers, I felt overwhelmed. Despite that, I believe it’s an important addition to the many books extolling the Allies and the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign.
In The Bombers and the Bombed (Viking Press 2013), Richard Overy dispels all but the first statement above.
In an extremely well researched and annotated text (over a hundred pages of notes and bibliography alone), Mr. Overy documents how the British in particular saw those who worked in the factories as being part of the war machine and justifiable targets. This decision went as high as Churchill and Roosevelt. Residential areas around factories were considered fair game, with the hope of both slowing production and reducing support for the Reich.
It didn’t work that way until the last few months of the war, Mr. Overy contends. With manufacturing sites decentralized and scattered, bombing them did little to slow production. Germany had an abundant supply of labor, forced or otherwise, to work in unhealthy underground situations. German manufacture of aircraft increased through 1944.
Mr. Overy also contends, with voluminous data, that “strategic” high level bombing with the technology of the 1940’s was woefully inaccurate. Targets were rarely hit by more than a minute proportion of the bomb loads, if at all. Indeed, it was uncommon to have more than 10% of the bombs fall within a kilometer of the target.
It remains a bit unclear how much the German people actually wanted to continue to produce goods for the Reich and how much they did so for fear of reprisals.
The author notes that, repeatedly in air raids, the allies lost more aircrews than casualties on the ground, except, again, until the last few months of the war.
He also takes note of the bombing campaigns in Italy, France, the low countries, and the Scandinavian countries. The Italian campaign tended to be more “tactical,” in direct support of ground military action, and a bit more limited. In the rest of Europe, and in France in particular, the targeting of civilian populations and carpet bombing of cities became a very difficult sell to the population on the ground, threatening post war alliances before they were even agreed to.
This book, while deeply informative, is not a particularly fun read. It feels more like a textbook; at times the author dropped so many numbers, I felt overwhelmed. Despite that, I believe it’s an important addition to the many books extolling the Allies and the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign.
